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Literary Influence: a Rule of Thumb? 
Who that shall point as with a wand, and say 
'This portion of the river of my mind 
Came from yon fountain?' 
Wordsworth, The Prelude (1805), II, 213-5. 
Once upon a time it was assumed that the primary obligation of 
a work of art was 'to hold as 'twere the mirror up to nature' (Hamlet, 
1lI, ii); to imitate, to re-present, to reflect 'reality' or 'nature'. There 
were three qualifying assumptions implicit from the beginning, 
however. The first was that the 'nature' so reflected or re-presented 
would manifest aspects of the chosen medium or mirror, thus 
making it constitutionally different from 'nature' itself or the world 
in which we 'live and breathe and have our being'. The second, 
related assumption was that all the different instances of 'nature' 
reflected or re-presented in the same medium or mirror would 
manifest constitutional resemblances deriving from that common 
medium. The third and final assumption was that, along with the 
people, things, and events in the world at large that make up 'reality' 
or 'nature', previous instances of their reflection or re-presentation 
become themselves the legitimate object of reflection or re-
presentation. As well as objects in 'nature', then, artistic genre (the 
chosen medium or mirror) and other works of art (those previous 
instances of reflection or re-presentation) were assumed to condition 
and compose the complex 'image' that was the work of art. The 
critical appreciation of a work of art therefore necessarily involved, 
besides judging its fidelity to 'reality' or 'nature' and its competence 
at handling artistic conventions, an assessment of the significance 
of specific influences: the informing and constituting 'in-flow' or 
effect of other works of art. 
* Dr WiU Christie is a member of the Department of English at the University of 
Sydney. 
7 
Translation; imitation; parody, both gratuitous and 'serious'; 
the revisionary adaptation of a traditional genre or mythos (plot! 
story) by inverting, extending, completing, distorting, or digressing 
from it-these and other structural and rhetorical practices have 
always been familiar to the specialist and general reader alike. 
Correspondingly, 'practical criticism', from at least Dryden and 
certainly since the 19208 when it was explicitly theorized and 
became the basis of the academic discipline known as 'English', 
has always respected and to some extent explored the multiplicity 
of ways in which literature builds self-consciously on previous 
works of literature. Whether meaning has been regarded as an 
authorial prerogative, only imperfectly communicated in and by 
the text and/or imperfectly understood by the individual reader; 
whether as inherent in the text itself and susceptible of one or more 
valid interpretations; whether as an 'event' effected by the 
collaborative and creative response of the reader to the text-still, 
meaning has been recognized as often overtly or covertly contingent 
upon other works of literature, past and present. 
What has not always been registered, however, is the extent to 
which all forms of literary influence also invoke complex questions 
of cultural and intellectual continuity and appropriation on the one 
hand and, on the other and more immediately, of how a specific 
influence is to be distinguished and characterized critically and 
how its effects, meaning, and value are to be established. The very 
familiarity of literary influence, especially in our own century 
where literature's recourse to other literary works can seem 
tiresomely perfunctory, often discourages close enquiry and the 
necessarily fine critical discriminations it in fact demands. 
Not that questions of literary influence have ever been ignored 
by the theorists. At the beginning of the critical tradition that we 
inherited from the ancient world, extended debate on textual 
mimesis or imitatio was already well under way and included such 
issues as the origins of poetry or art; what we would call 
'intellectual property'; the status or relative 'perfection' of Homer's 
'reality' or 'nature' as against that of 'reality' or 'nature' itself; 
the spiritual and social value of literature. Since then, philosophy 
and literary criticism have consistently conferred on these and 
related issues. Only with the advent of linguistically based 
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criticism like semiotics and structuralism, however, as well as of 
Northrop Frye's archetypal or mythological criticism, was an 
attempt made critically to theorize and systematically to anatomize 
or classify the characteristically literary nature of literature. 
Behind these professedly 'scientific' developments, however, 
were assumptions about linguistic and literary autonomy-about 
language and literature as independent, 'self-referring' conventions 
only tenuously or indirectly related to 'reality' or 'nature' -that 
threatened to collapse distinctions made by writers and readers 
alike. And the last twenty or thirty years has seen an extension of 
this theoretical tendency, with a good deal of energy expended on 
literary influence in the abstract; on the genetic literariness of 
literature or 'intertextuality', as it is called. For the intertexualists, 
a poem might be said to consist of residual traces or fragments 
from a multiplicity of other~r, for some, traces from all other-
works or texts. There are a number of types of intertextuality, in 
fact, ranged between the extremes of what might be called 'soft' 
and 'hard' intertextuality, after philosophy's distinction between 
'soft' and 'hard' determinism. 
The former, or soft intertextuality, still respects the integrity of 
poet and poem while it centralizes the relationship between a 
poem and its literary predecessors, making that relationship the 
definitive characteristic of literature-what Coleridge would have 
called its informing 'principle of individuation, the inmost 
principle of the possibility, of any thing, as that particular thing'I. 
The most comprehensive and idiosyncratic example of this 
approach is represented by the work of the American critic 
Harold Bloom, whose Anxiety of Influence sees literature as a 
struggle or 'agon' involving a limited and identifiable number of 
strategies or 'revisionary ratios' between a 'strong' poet and his or 
her chosen precursor2. 
Hard intertextuality, on the other hand, sees the literary work, 
not as the outcome of the poet's <Edipal struggle to overcome the 
constraining influence of an earlier major poet by 'rewriting' that 
poetry in his or her own terms, nor more generally as a discrete 
entity echoing with ancestral voices, but as the arbitrary and 
depersonalized 'site' of innumerable intertextual relations; a sort 
of conceptual 'space' between a work or text of illusory discreteness 
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on the one hand and, on the other, that multiplicity of other 
works or texts from which it has been traditionally but arbitrarily 
demarcated, as time is arbitrarily demarcated into discrete moments. 
The 'reality' of literature for the hard intertextualist, its abstract 
location or mode of existence, is not to be found in individual texts 
or in textuality at aU; on the contrary, its 'reality' is its intertextual 
condition, or is to be 'found' disappearing into the amorphous 
intertext. 
However compelling, one result of all this has been that the 
less abstract but no less complex or exigent questions that I 
mentioned earlier are simply not being asked. Discriminations 
important for the practice of criticism and the historical study of 
literary practice are being lost before they have even been found, 
so to speak. All literary language may only ever be a form of literary 
allusion and unable to re-present anything besides other texts, but 
for the purposes of critical and indeed cultural practice 'no, I am 
not a tragic figure' remains qualitatively different from 'No, I am 
not Prince Hamlet' , and an elegy in rhyming couplets from an elegy 
in Spenserian stanzas. 
It is not just from the sophistications of certain forms of theory 
alone that a discriminating criticism of literary influence requires 
protection, however. There is a perennial naivety threatening it as 
weU-a naivety, moreover, with which the different theoretical 
tradition concerned with the psychology or phenomenology of 
reading and with the role of the reader in literary hermeneutics can 
be of assistance. 
The best way to approach this is by contrasting the ideas of 
two commentators, each with his own renown, writing two hundred 
years apart. However little else Samuel Johnson and Hans Georg 
Gadamer may have in common, they both defer to individual 
response in defining and attempting the interpretation and 
evaluation of literature, as indeed of life itself. It is with the 
apparently different conclusions to which this deference leads them 
that we are concerned, especially on an unlikely subject central to 
any experiential or phenomenological approach to literature: the 
subject of prejudice. 
Dr Johnson delivered his challenge to a long tradition ofliterary 
elitism when he denied any prerogative in critical deCision-making 
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to what we would call 'the expert'-today, the professional or 
academic critic-conferring it instead upon readers 'uncorrupted 
by literary prejudices' whose 'common sense' qualified them to 
decide 'all claims to poetical honours'3. The context is Johnson's 
discussion of Thomas Gray's Elegy Written in a Country 
Churchyard in the Lives of the Poets and although it is difficult to 
determine the tone of the passage, the ultimate recourse to the 
common reader is too characteristic of his criticism for it to be 
dismissed as either sarcastic or perfunctory. Conditioned or 
'influenced' expectations resulting from reading and brought to bear 
in reading-whether merely fashionable or,like his own, massively 
informed~nly destroy for Johnson the possibility of a fresh 
response. 
To Johnson's pre-Kantian understanding of things, then-the 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant would argue the active 
collaboration of the human mind in all human perception and 
experience; to Johnson's understanding, 'common sense' implied a 
wisdom derived rather from the world of common experience than 
from literature, education, or systematic theory. For Gadamer, on 
the other hand, it 'is not so much our judgements as it is our 
prejudices that constitute our being' (meaning, I take it, something 
like 'our identity'; 'our being' is at once too grand and too 
ambiguous a claim). He continues: 
the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the 
literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of 
our whole ability to experience. 
For Johnson, to read with the 'prejudice' of expectation and 
prior knowledge is to read with the mind closed to experience, 
impervious to certain literary possibilities. For Gadamer, by 
contrast, 'prejudices are the bases of our openness to the world'4. 
Changes in the precise meaning and moral charge of the word 
'prejudice' should not blind us to a radical difference in their 
theory of knowledge. Johnson aspires to a willing suspension or 
dissolution of 'literary prejudices' before a fresh, or 'primitive', 
or 'original' confrontation with the text-an aspiration that is 
curiously poignant in the light of his own capacious familiarity 
with literature. Gadamer insists that any apparent novelty or 
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freshness of experience in fact derives only from such prejudices 
as have already accrued: 'Is not our expectation and our readiness 
to hear the new also necessarily determined by the old that has 
already taken possession of us?' As in our daily experience, so in 
our reading: the conscious and unconscious expectations or 
anticipations that inform our negotiations with the familiar are 
accompanied by an alertness, even preadjustment to the 
unanticipated. The previously unfamiliar experiences that the 
reader undergoes are then assimilated into the 'expected and 
anticipated', to become part of his or her reconstituted and re-formed 
knowledge or understanding, giving rise to a new set of 'literary 
prejudices' . 
The paradigm of the mutual modification of the familiar and 
the unfamiliar that Gadamer here uses for his phenomenology of 
experience is the same as that adopted by T. S. Eliot in his essay 
'Tradition and the Individual Talent' specifically to characterize 
literary influence and literary evolution. 'A man must write' , insists 
Eliot (concerned for the moment rather with writing than reading), 
not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with a 
feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer, 
and within it the whole of the literature of his own country, has a 
simultaneous existence, and composes a simultaneous order.5 
The mother of the Muses was, after all, Mnemosyne or Memory. 
For Eliot, Tradition, or the common fund of literary texts, is the 
collective memory of a culture and approaches a sort of Jungian 
'collective unconscious', itself a typological reading of culture 
that has been internalized in the psyche of each individual. 
The passage and the essay undoubtedly reveal many of the 
preoccupations and anxieties of Eliot, as it does of Modernism as 
a self-conscious, literary movement, as well as a self-consciously 
literary movement. Eliot's own 'classicism', his belief in order 
and in a transcendent though adaptable authority, at once stable 
and self-contained yet paradoxically accommodating, is 
undoubtedly of interest for a biographical and historical study. 
But to explain an assumption or belief-to establish its personal 
and historical or ideological origins-is not to explain it away. 
That the paradigm should be found in Gadamer without the 
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reactionary social and political implications or the hauteur of a 
self-elected literary aristocrat suggests its functional validity as an 
hypothesis. 
Eliot goes on, making a transition from author to reader, creator 
to critic, that is vital for our purposes: 
no poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His 
significance, his appreciation, is the appreciation of his relation 
to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you 
must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead. I 
mean this as a principle of aesthetic, not merely historical, 
criticism6• 
Perhaps purposely confusing 'meaning' and 'value', Eliot is 
saying that the very act of creation or composing involves the 
individual writer in relationship with a manifold of texts and 
textual conventions that he or she inherits from the past, from 
Tradition-most importantly, perhaps, the convention of language. 
Outside the context of this Tradition the meaning of a work of 
art is greatly impoverished-in fact, it becomes effectively 
meaningless and certainly valueless. 
The idea, in more or less rigorous philosophical forms, 
characterizes all thinking in which an implicit or explicit appeal 
is made for a reading and a criticism of literature not (or not 
exclusively) in the context of any extra-literary 'reality' -whether 
a transcendent world or 'nature' or history or biography or 
prevailing ideas-but in the context of literature itself. Again to 
quote T. S. Eliot: 'When we are considering poetry we must 
consider it primarily as poetry and not another thing'7, though 
Eliot's classicism transforms 'Tradition' from a body of 
'influential' literary texts into a sort of transcendental, cultural 
superego. The argument of Harold Bloom about a poet's 'anxiety 
of influence' that I referred to--that anxiety which issues in an 
heroic struggle by a later poet to displace his intimidating 
precursor in order to achieve an individual voice-is an 
idiosyncratic digression from this assumption. What it does is to 
make 'influence' the psychogenesis, the forum, the form, and the 
meaning of the work: what poetry is, and what it is about. 
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Next to Gadamer's dialectical model of experience, with what 
is known helping to process the unknown, Johnson's idea of a 
pristine interaction between an 'uncorrupted' (spontaneous; 
uninfluenced) reader and an 'original' (spontaneous; uninfluenced) 
text is bound to seem naive, a radical nostalgia, especially coming 
from a professional reader and writer whose life was a 'continual 
allegory' of the expanding print culture of his period and whose 
'works were the comments upon it'8. 
And so it is-naive, that is, and nostalgic, though only at 
the same time as it simultaneously reflects the pragmatism for 
which Johnson is renowned. What the paradox of Johnson's 
championship of the unliterary or uneducated response reflects is 
another paradox: the paradox of eighteenth-century print culture 
itself, as well as the irony of Johnson's own magisterial function 
in that culture. Many of those that made up the new eighteenth-
century reading public did indeed think of themselves as 
comparatively unread, only they saw it rather as ignorance than 
innocence, and in fact sought expeditiously to acquire a familiarity 
with literature and correct taste-in short, 'literary prejudices' -in 
order to gain access to the cultural establishment. Their needs 
were amply met by encyclopredias; by histories and biographies 
of literature and the literati of the kind Johnson himself wrote; by 
dictionaries like Johnson's own; by rhetorics of belles lettres and 
discourses on taste; by annotated editions like Johnson's 
Shakespeare and by anthologies of the nation's literature like the 
edition of British Poets from which his Lives of the Poets 
derived-in other words, by all the characteristic products of an 
unlicensed, economically competitive press pandering to class-
conscious acquisitiveness. Even while Johnson promoted the 
unpretentious taste of the first generation of what would become 
a mass reading public, the reading public desperately sought 
manufactured 'literary prejudices' as the basis of its pretensions 
to a predominantly literary culture. 
What for our purposes is crucial is that Johnson's tendency 
to see in the 'literary' a betrayal of 'spontaneity', 'sincerity', 
'authenticity', and all that family of attributes associated with a 
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type of primitivism reinforced by Romanticism, has oot entirely 
left us. Students often insist on the prerogative of an 'inoocent' 
reading, unencumbered by the 'pedantry' of conventions, literary 
sources, and all that intimidating business contained in editorial 
notes. The problem is that, granting for the moment the simplistic 
alternatives of 'innocent' and 'experienced', an innocent reading 
is just as critically indiscriminate as that version of intertextuality 
that sees all literature as nothing other than a patchwork of past 
literature. What, for example, can such a reading make of a 
literary work whose comprehension and criticism is more or less 
dependent on previous literature than another work? In short, 
how can it cope with degrees of literary self-consciousness-with 
the ,difference between Wordsworth and T. S. Eliot, say-or 
degrees of expressiveness or proficiency in the use of extant 
literature? 
In his attempt to assert the critical prerogative of what in fact 
amounted to market forces, Johnson chose to ignore two 
analogous though categorically different phenomena. The first, 
familiar from Gadamer and Eliot, is that it is solely by virtue of 
inherent literary prejudices or precognitions-'the initial 
directedness of our whole ability to experience' -4hat literature can 
signify or 'mean' at all (rather as familiarity with the possibilities 
of a language is required to understand something new in that 
language). Until we master the basic conventions, the individual 
case remains 'a closed book'. Prejudices in this sense are essential 
to our reading, a fact that goes to the heart of the current 
controversies about 'cultural literacy' and 'the canon' . 
The second oversight might be called ideological, and it sees 
prejudices in the sense of predispositions or partialities: 
conditioned and largely unconscious preferences and expectations. 
These 'literary prejudices' are not so much abstractly essential, 
as historically and humanly inevitable. In this sense, the rapid 
accumulation of cultural 'capital' required by the aspiring 
eighteenth-century reader could only have involved an exchange 
of one set of literary prejudices for another, not the shift implied 
in Johnson's Life of Gray from open-mindedness, whether 
innocent or ignorant, to experienced prejudice. To quote Terry 
Eagleton: 
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the reader does not come to the text as a kind of cultural virgin, 
miraculously free of previous social and literary entanglements, 
a supremely disinterested spirit or blank sheet on to which the 
text will transfer its own inscriptions. Most of us recognize that 
no reading is innocent or without presuppositions9. 
The idea of interpretation carried on from within a 
configuration of our own prejudices as ideology brings with it 
the obligation to 'stake out the limits of human enquiry', 
however. For beyond helping to dispense with the idea of a simple 
transaction between an 'innocent' reader and a fully 'knowable' 
text, it actually raises the possibility of our only ever reading our 
own prejudices back to ourselves, so to speak. How far we can 
divest ourselves of ideology in an attempt to see 'the object as in 
itself it really is' (Matthew Arnold's definition of a truly 
disinterested criticism10), or to see our own ideology 'as in itself it 
really is', must remain a moot point. Ideology aside, the very idea 
of interpretation as involving the conscious or unconscious 
application of one's experience raises problems for Arnold's 
disinterested reader. A part of the experience brought to bear on a 
specific text will be the direct or indirect experience of that text 
itself, as well as of analogous or homologous texts which, having 
been assimilated, have already exerted an influence and modified 
the consciousness of the interpreter. According to Heidegger's 
existential reformulation of the dilemma: 'if the "world" itself is 
something constitutive for Dasein ["being" or "a being or entity"], 
one must have an insight into Dasein's basic structures in order 
to treat the world-phenomenon conceptually' 11. 
Thus is human consciousness caught up in what has been 
called 'the hermeneutic circle': the act of reading and the reader 
are 'always already' modified by what has been read, while what is 
and was read remains contingent upon the act of reading and upon 
the reader. Coleridge, for example, discovered himself a victim of 
the same paradox when attempting a disinterested reading of the 
Bible; when attempting a reading 'uncorrupted by literary 
prejudices' , that is: 
I take up this work with the purpose to read it for the fIrst time as 
I should any other work,-as far at least as I can or dare. For I 
neither can, nor dare, throw off a strong and awful prepossession 
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in its favour-certain as 1 am that a large part of the light and life, 
in which and by which 1 see, love, and embrace the truths and the 
strengths co-organised into a living body of faith and knowledge 
... has been directly or indirectly derived to me from this sacred 
volume,-and [I am] unable to determine what 1 do not owe to 
its influences. 
To simplify: Coleridge's reading of the Bible was informed by 
certain basic cultural assumptions that derived from the Bible12• 
So it is with our own reading, if not of the Bible, then of the 
major English poets. Even if we have never read a Shakespeare 
play we can hardly expect a disinterested reading, given his 
influence upon our language and culture. When it was suggested 
to T. S. Eliot that 'dead writers' remained remote because he and 
his contemporaries knew so much more than in the past, his 
celebrated response-'Precisely, and they are that which we 
know' -implied a similar, equally simple recognition of this 
complex, paradoxical phenomenon10• 
The often capricious and indeterminate symbiosis of subject 
and object in experience generally, and in literary experience 
and understanding in particular, does not negate the possibility of 
interpretation, however, nor does it condemn us to a self-echoing 
knowledge or a solipsistic universe. Rather it respects the relative 
validity only of anyone interpretation. As relativity, however 
complex and elusive, is not arbitrariness, the practical and 
theoretical questions of literary influence remain notwithstanding. 
I spoke earlier of a number of complex questions invoked by 
the use of literature in literary practice. To introduce just a handful 
of the sorts of questions I have in mind I want to quote the 
comments of a distinguished American critic on the way a familiar 
work of the 1920s utilizes Shakespeare's Hamlet in a crucial 
interchange. The passage under Benjamin Thumb's relentless 
scrutiny is the following: 
'You ought to look at that tree right over there', said Rabbit ... 
'I can see a bird in it from here', said Pooh. 
'Or is it a fish?' 
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'You ought to see that bird from here', said Rabbit, 'unless it's 
a fish'. 
'It isn't a fish, it's a bird' , said Piglet. 
'So it is', said Rabbit. 
'Is it a starling or a blackbird?' , said Pooh. 
'That's the whole question', said Rabbit. 'Is it a blackbird or a 
starling?' 
Professor Thumb's authoritative comments, on the other hand, are 
uncompromising: 
I feel sorry for any reader who might be so ignorant as to fail to 
recognize this exchange as a replica of Hamlet's 'Very like a 
whale' conversation with Polonius. 
The quotation and its gloss come in fact from a parody by 
Frederick C. Crews of an obsessive 'sources and analogues' 
approach to literary criticism14, the overriding irony of which is 
that, by exploiting literary (critical) sources and analogues, Crews 
is himself 'under the influence' of literature. For our purposes, the 
success of Crews's parody can be measured by the extent to which 
it forces the reader to confront certain critical issues. We are 
immediately reminded of how dependent the effectiveness of 
influence is upon the reader's recognition of the original, for 
example. But 'Who is the reader?' , as Stanley Fish not unreasonably 
asks (Fish, incidentally, does exist, in spite of the ironic coincidence 
of his surname). 'The reader', according to Fish himself, 'is the 
informed reader': 
The informed reader is someone who (1) is a competent 
speaker of the language out of which the text is built up; 
(2) is in full possession of the semantic knowledge that a 
mature listener brings to his task of comprehension ... (3) has 
literary competence. That is, he is sufficiently experienced as a 
reader to have internalised the properties of literary discourses, 
including everything from the most local of devices '" to 
whole genres. In this theory, then, the concerns of other 
schools of criticism-such as questions of genre, conventions, 
intellectual background-become redefined in terms of potential 
and probable response. 1S 
Few readers of any age or degree of expertise would be likely 
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to recognize the vital 'replication' of Hamlet in Winnie-the-Pooh, 
however, and fewer still of those introduced to A. A. Milne 
at the age of five. The issue, then, is not only one of abstract 
familiarity or access, but also one of the nature and extent of the 
real or historical audience anticipated or solicited by any work. The 
implied reader of Professor Thumb's Winnie-the-Pooh is Fish's 
'informed reader', possessed of a more intimate familiarity with 
extant literature (not to mention with bears) than might reasonably 
be expected of a five-year-old-indeed of as intimate a familiarity 
as is possible. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the allusion really is 
there, we then have to assume that few readers were meant to 
recognize it. Are we not further obliged to conclude that A. A. 
Milne was writing, not for an informed reader at all, but for an 
informed coterie or elite (or both)? Or that he was enjoying a 
private joke at his readers' expense? Perhaps, on the other hand, 
he was unconscious of the influence himself, in which case the 
allusion to Hamlet would mean something different again, or 
signify differently; it would certainly not be meaningless or less 
significant. With anyone of these possibilities, the significance 
of the influence would alter quite radically and so would the 
'meaning' of the passage, whether meaning was conceived as 
objective or subjective (what it means or what it means to me, the 
reader). Benjamin Thumb's shrewd insight may demonstrate the 
value of an acute and 'informed' criticism, making certain subtle 
or hidden meanings available to a wider reading public, but it is 
still only the beginning of the work of explication. Nor is Thumb's 
exemplary reader-himself-necessarily the reader sought by the 
text. The reader sought by a text may be one of more limited 
information than the critic pretends to. 
Furthermore, Thumb may be wrong; he may even be guilty of 
constraining a reading beyond either the evidence or reasonable 
consensus--of having his 'thumb on the scale', so to speak, and 
giving a false 'weight' to the Hamlet reference. And not only 
wrong about the allusion but wrong-headed in his critical approach. 
It is always possible to mistake some superficial evidence for 
meaningful influence; it is almost inevitable when one reads 
attentive only to possible literary analogues or antecedents. To 
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proceed on the assumption that A. A. Milne is expressing himself 
or communicating largely by means of allusion to another literary 
text may be to overlook the mimetic or expressive possibilities 
of simple dialogic misunderstanding as distinct from Hamlet's 
wilful and manipulative 'misunderstanding'. 
On the other hand (to explore the subject further), one may 
feel persuaded that Thumb has come up with a 'genuine' echo on 
this occasion or that, more generally, he is dealing with a legitimate 
genealogy of language or form, and yet may remain unimpressed 
by his conviction of its critical importance, convinced rather that 
it were best muted or ignored because it contributes little or 
nothing of any real significance to our reading and interpretation 
of A. A. Milne. Even granted an influence, in other words, it is 
possible to mistake or to exaggerate its rhetorical function. 
Which raises the question we have yet to broach of its 
effectiveness or value. When is an unequivocal influence used 
creatively, for example, and when, on the other hand, does it 
threaten or destroy certain expressive possibilities? The invocation 
of a well known and admired original in an uneven or tiresomely 
derivative text can accentuate its inadequacies and drive the reader 
beyond patience. Or an allusion intended to operate only 'locally', 
as it were-to enhance the definitive or suggestive power of a 
specific image or phrase-may unwittingly import so many and 
such various implications from the rich context of its original that 
it turns out to be unintentionally 'self-destructive' on the poet's 
part, contradicting or obSCuring the evolved complex of related and 
mutually reinforcing meanings in the text. 
We do have the text to help us settle the question of whether 
Thumb's detecting a significant allusion here is an act of inSight 
or idiocy, notoriously vulnerable to conflicting interpretation 
though texts are (one reader's 'bird' will always be another's 'fish'). 
In the end the critic can only seek the confirmation of a general, 
invariably qualified consent; between comparably careful readers, 
critical disagreement can only be productive. The first thing that 
needs to be done is to ask the right questions and to make 
discriminations that keep faith with the complexity of poetic 
utterance. 
What we can say with more confidence is that the identification 
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of the influence of a prior work of art can never obviate the 
critical assessment of its function or meaning; that theoretical 
sophistications should not be allowed to blunt important critical 
and cultural instruments; finally, that a knowledge and feeling for 
the body of literature out of which anyone work evolves-whether 
we think of it as just a 'body' or, more controversially, as a canon 
or tradition-is just as vital, if not more vital, to reading and making 
meaning as it is to effecting cultural coercions. 
Too much recent literary theory prides itself on its discovery 
of the radical artificiality-the literariness-{)f consciousness, 
establishing its validity in reaction and even resentment against 
'traditional' assumptions about literature as the mirror of life or 
nature. From its beginnings, in fact, criticism has always 
respected the role of literature, both in literature itself and in 
experience. Different generations, different cultures, and different 
individuals have approached the issue of literary influence 
differently, but it has always been an issue to be reckoned with 
and, while a critical response is as natural to us as breathing, will 
always remain one. 
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